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I. INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001 began like any other day but took a drastic
turn at 8:45 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time when a plane, hijacked by
terrorists, crashed into the northern tower of the World Trade Center,
setting it afire.1 As Americans mourned in silence, a second plane
rammed through the southern tower of the World Trade Center at
9:05 a.m. and set it aflame. 2 The horror continued, as a third plane
crashed into the Pentagon, a fourth diverted into a field in
Pennsylvania, and both towers of the World Trade Center collapsed.3
It did not take long for Americans to realize they had been
attacked on their own soil by an impervious enemy - terrorists. 4 This
kind of attack was unprecedented in U.S. history, and the death toll
reached nearly 3,000 within a few hours. 5 President George W. Bush
addressed the nation on the night of September 11, stating:
Terrorist acts can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch
the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel but they cannot dent the steel of
American resolve.. .Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we
responded with the best of America.
6
1. CNN.com, September 11: Chronology of Terror, http://archives.cnn.com2001/US/09/ll/
chronology.attack/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. (noting that the President remarked at 9:30 a.m. on Sept. 11, 2001 that the
country had suffered an "apparent terrorist attack").
5. CNN.com, September 11: A Memorial, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/memorial
(last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
6. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Following Alleged Terrorist Attacks
on New York and Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour
/bb/military/terroristattack/bushspeech.html.
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Americans quickly determined that not only had terrorists
attacked on U.S. soil, but also that terrorists had taken advantage of
the U.S. financial system to fund the horrific events of September 11. 7
Government officials suspected that the terrorists laundered money
through banks in the United States and abroad, and through other
highly valuable assets, including real estate.8 Consequently, not only
did the events of September 11 leave an indelible mark in the hearts
and minds of Americans, but these events dramatically changed the
country's economy, government, industry, and politics.
One area of the economy remained stable despite the tragic
events of September 11: real estate. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this sector of the U.S. economy will escape the consequences
of the tragedy. On October 26, 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act ("Patriot Act") was signed into law.9 The
stated purpose of the law was "to deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement
investigatory tools, and for other purposes." 10 Towards that end, the
Patriot Act enhanced the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act to
eliminate money laundering as Congress determined that money
laundering had partially funded the terrorist activities. 1'
Included in the Bank Secrecy Act's definition of financial
institutions, adopted by the Patriot Act, were "persons involved in real
estate closings and settlements." 1 2 The Bank Secrecy Act required the
creation of a paper trail of important financial records when a
transaction involved large amounts of currency to further its goal of
"protect[ing] against international terrorism."1 3  The Patriot Act
expanded these existing reporting requirements and strengthened
communication among the reporting entities.' 4  The Act also
empowered the Treasury Department to determine the extent to
which it would regulate certain financial institutions under the
7. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302, 115
Stat. 272, 296-98 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
8. See id.
9. Alicia L. Rause, USA PATRIOT Act: Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
Legislation in the U.S. and Europe Since September 11th, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L. AND COMP. L. REV.
173, 173 (2003).
10. Patriot Act, supra note 7, § 302.
11. Rebecca Gregory, The Lawyer's Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the Fight Against
Money Laundering and Terrorism?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 23, 23-24 (2003).
12. Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(U) (2000).
13. Id. § 5311.
14. NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 9-10 (2003).
1707
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Patriot Act. The Department, however, has yet to render a decision
regarding the real estate sector. 15
Implementation of the Patriot Act in the real estate industry,
particularly on lawyers in the field, presents a unique question of how
to balance the protection of attorney-client communications against
the need to reduce terrorist financing activities. Real estate
professionals generally support combating money laundering but are
hesitant to impose stringent measures on the field because of a variety
of concerns. 16 Part II of this Note analyzes the background behind the
Patriot Act, other counter-terrorism laws, and money laundering laws.
Part III discusses several hurdles in the effort to implement the law
and examines different ways the real estate sector can contribute to
the war on terror. Part IV proposes a plan to implement the Act in the
real estate sector. This proposal would establish a specific list for use
in determining who should be primarily responsible for complying
with the anti-money laundering procedures of the Patriot Act for each
real estate transaction. Designating a person to have primary
responsibility will enable the other parties involved in the transaction
to rely on the designated party's fulfillment of the duties, thus
avoiding conflict and wasted resources.
15. Gregory, supra note 11, at 24.
16. See, e.g., Dechert LLP, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/kalogredis.pdf (noting that Dechert LLP supported "FinCEN in its aim of
preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities" but expressed "concern
about the breadth of the application of the Proposal"); Escrow Institute of California, Regulatory
Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real
Estate, at 10-11 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/pothier.pdf (recognizing the
Escrow Institute of California's support of the FinCEN's "efforts to strengthen the anti-money
laundering system and rules already in effect," but then arguing for the carving out of an
exception for residential and smaller commercial real estate transactions); RE/MAX
International, Inc., Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 1 (May 28, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/jesperson.pdf (establishing that RE/MAX supported "the goals and
objectives of the Act in its fight to detect and prosecute money laundering activities that finance
terrorism and terrorist activities," but supporting an exception for real estate licensees).
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II. BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
Though the origin of money laundering is unclear, historians
speculate that it has existed for thousands of years. 17 In the United
States, money laundering received its name during Prohibition. 18
Restrictions on gambling and drinking "caused a dramatic increase in
financial crime" because criminals had to disguise the origins of the
large sums of money involved in this illegal activity. 19 The term
"money laundering" derives from the practice of using Mafia owned
laundromats to hide the large sums of cash received "from extortion,
prostitution, gambling and bootleg liquor."20 Laundromats were ideal
because they were cash businesses and criminals were able to merge
legitimate and illegitimate funds. 21
The term "money laundering" was not used in U.S. courts until
1982 in United States v. $4,255,625.39.22 Although money laundering
was clearly surfacing as a problem in the United States before that
time, the extent of the problem remains unclear. 23 Money laundering
rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, in part because of the
"unexpected explosion in narcotics trading. ' 24  Drug trafficking
contributed heavily to the money laundering problem, and much of the
laundered money was placed "in the U.S. financial system by
commingling drug proceeds with funds generated at legitimate
businesses, by purchasing real estate and vehicles, and by exploiting
17. Countermoneylaundering.com, A Brief History of Money Laundering, http://www.
countermoneylaundering.com/pO8.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. A Little History about Money Laundering, http://www.unc.educourses/pre2000fall
law357c/cyberprojects/springOO/offshore/moneyintro.html (last visited September 7, 2005).
21. Id.
22. 551 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see also A Little History about Money Laundering,
http://www.unc.edu/courses/pre2000fall/law357c/cyberprojects/spring00/offshore/moneyintro.htm
1 (last visited September 7, 2005).
23. Proximal Consulting, What is Money Laundering? Why is It So Important to Stop It?
Some Frequently Asked Questions on the Subject, http://www.proximalconsulting.com
Whatismoneylaundeirng.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) ("In truth nobody knows how much
dirty money is being laundered (or attempted to be laundered) on a global basis.").
24. Gary Manger, The Global Response to Money Laundering: How Global Politics Shaped
the Response, http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/2002-mlpartl.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
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the gaming industry."25  Recognizing this problem, the U.S.
government criminalized money laundering in 1986 to prevent people
from being able "to disguise the true source and nature of their
illegally gained wealth."26
In 1999, the United Nations assessed the breadth of the
international money laundering problem, estimating that "organized
criminal syndicates made $1.5 trillion each year."27 This figure
provides a baseline from which to measure the scale of the problem. In
reality, this problem is likely much more widespread than reported, as
secrecy is the key to its continued success. 28 Some estimate that
money laundering is the largest industry on the planet (larger than
arms or oil), constituting 3 to 5 percent of the global gross domestic
product. 29 In response to this global problem, the United States
imposed stricter regulations and joined in international efforts to
eliminate the crime throughout the world.30
After the events of September 11, the focus of much of the anti-
money laundering legislation moved from drug traffickers and other
criminals to terrorist financing.31 According to Interpol, 32 the terrorist
"attempts to conceal his activities in preparing his crime to avoid
detection; [but] the terrorist's weakest link is the fact that he requires
funding.. .the frequency and seriousness of international terrorist acts
are often proportionate to the financing that terrorists might get."33 In
25. National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2003,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs3/3300/money.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
26. See A Little History about Money Laundering, http://www.unc.educourses/
pre2000fall/law357c/cyberprojects/springOO/offshore/moneyintro.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005)
("Money laundering in the US was not criminalized until the passing of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986" (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1956, 1957)).
27. Proximal Consulting, What is Money Laundering? Why is It So Important to Stop It?
Some Frequently Asked Questions on the Subject, http://www.proximalconsulting.com
Whatismoneylaundeirng.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005)
28. See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, About FinCEN/FAQs,
http://www.fincen.gov/reg-bsaregulations.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) (establishing that
money laundering is an enormous problem that extends far beyond drug trafficking).
29. Manger, supra note 24.
30. See discussion infra Part II.B.
31. Manger, supra note 24.
32. Interpol is an organization that provides "proactive support for police operations
throughout the world" and "whose mission is preventing, detecting and suppressing crime."
Interpol, Interpol Vision, Core Functions and Mission, http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/
default.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
33. Interpol, The Financing of Terrorism, http://www.interpol.int/Public/Terrorism/
financing.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
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response, governments have begun to combat terrorist financing
through heavier regulation in many fields, including real estate. 34
B. Legislation and History Leading to the Patriot Act
1. The Bank Secrecy Act
Long before September 11, legislators knew that criminals
were manipulating the American financial system to integrate illegal
money into the marketplace to finance crime and terrorism. Congress
initially addressed the issue in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act. 35 The
Bank Secrecy Act aimed "to prevent banks and other financial service
providers from being used as intermediaries for, or to hide the transfer
or deposit of money derived from, criminal activity."36  The Act
proposed to "protect against international terrorism" by mandating
the creation of a paper trail of financial records for any transaction
involving large amounts of currency. 37 Furthermore, the Act required
financial institutions to file Currency Transaction Reports with the
Treasury Department for transactions involving more than $10,000 in
cash.38 These reports identify the identity and contact information of
the person depositing, withdrawing, or exchanging the cash.
Money laundering was formally established as a crime in 1986
"when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957, which control[led]
domestic and international money laundering as well as undercover
sting operations."39  In 1987, all federally insured depository
34. See Gregory, supra note 11, at 33 (evidencing that the Gatekeeper Initiative aimed to
include lawyers, accountants and other financial intermediaries in the effort to prohibit money
laundering and terrorist financing). Although the effort to restrict terrorist financing is
associated with anti-money laundering procedures, terrorist financing is somewhat different
than traditional money laundering. Countermoneylaundering.com, The Funding of Terrorism,
http://www.countermoney laundering.comlp05a.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). Traditional
money laundering involves money that is "dirty" when it enters the system; in contrast, terrorist
financing usually involves legitimate funds which are intended for illegitimate purposes once in
the system. Id. Semantically, the two are lumped into one category and will be addressed as
such in this Note.
35. Gregory, supra note 11, at 27; see also Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5326 (2000)
(establishing that the purpose of this subchapter of the Bank Secrecy Act was "to protect against
international terrorism").
36. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY AND ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, BANK
SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 1 (2000), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/bsa.pdf.
37. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2000).
38. Id. § 5313(a); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2002).
39. Gregory, supra note 11, at 27.
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institutions and credit unions were required to establish anti-money
laundering policies. 40 These policies include using due diligence to
detect money laundering, educating employees in regard to money
laundering, and performing internal audits to ensure the policies were
being successfully implemented. 41
To evade this reporting system, criminals began structuring
deals that enabled them to deposit money in amounts smaller than
$10,000. To combat this problem, Congress amended the Bank
Secrecy Act to require Suspicious Activity Reporting, 42 which requires
financial institutions to report any transaction that might involve a
possible violation of law or regulation. 43 This amendment provided
law enforcement officers with more information than they would have
received in a simple report of all transactions over $10,000. 44
2. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
In 1990, the Department of Treasury created the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") "to provide an analytical
intelligence network focused on financial crimes." 45  The FinCEN
maintained a database of all Currency Transaction Reports and
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and made them available to law
enforcement officials at all levels. 46 Currently, the FinCEN also
enforces relevant sections of the Patriot Act on financial institutions to
encourage communication between law enforcement officers and
financial institutions.47
3. Financial Action Task Force
As laws began to more effectively eliminate money laundering,
criminals adapted their procedures to avoid detection. Money
launderers tried to avoid the strengthened reporting system in the
40. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2000); 67 Fed. Reg. 21,110-11 (Apr. 29, 2002).
41. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A)-(D) (2000).
42. Gregory, supra note 11, at 27-28 n.35 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL
EDUCATION, MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING USABOOK ONLINE 116 (2002)
("Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. § 5324 to curtail drug dealers from laundering profits through
structured schemes intended to avoid the reporting requirements.")).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2000).
44. Gregory, supra note 11, at 28. Note that reporting deposits of more than $10,000 is still
required.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Anti-Money Laundering Program Requirements for "Persons Involved in Real Estate
Closings and Settlements," 68 Fed. Reg. 17,569 (April 10, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
103) [hereinafter Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements].
1712 [Vol. 58:5:1705
2005] NO LOOPHOLES FOR TERRORIST FINANCING
United States by sending money to foreign shell corporations or banks
in countries with lax reporting requirements. 48
At the 1989 G-7 Summit meeting, the global community
responded to what was becoming an international money laundering
problem by establishing the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering ("FATF'). 49 This task force assembled legal, financial,
and law enforcement experts from across the world to develop and
promote policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.50
FATF designed the Forty Recommendations, which summarized the
money laundering countermeasures to be adopted by countries across
the globe. The Recommendations emphasized the importance of
establishing procedures for customer identification, record keeping,
and auditing of compliance with the standards. 51 Many countries
subsequently implemented the Recommendations within their
borders.5 2
As criminals began to once again exploit loopholes in these
procedures, a G-8 Conference on Combating Transnational Organized
Crime convened in 1999 to discuss expanding international efforts
beyond solely regulating financial institutions. 53  This initiative
originated from findings in a 1998 United Nations report which
concluded: "money launderers frequently use lawyers and accountants
to help them hide funds."54  The next step, which evolved into the
Gatekeeper Initiative, sought uniformity in regulating professionals-
particularly attorneys, accountants, and other financial
intermediaries. 55 The Gatekeeper Initiative "call[ed] on countries to
48. Gregory, supra note 11, at 29-30.
49. Id. at 31; see also Financial Action Task Force, More About the FATF and Its Work,
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATFen.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) (recognizing that "in
response to mounting concern over money laundering, the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering was established by the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris in 1989"); COMMENTS OF
THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION ON THE FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 1 (2002), available at http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf
(describing the FATF as "an inter-governmental body established by the G-7 Summit that was
held in Paris in 1989 for the purpose of developing and promoting policies, both at national and
international levels, to combat money laundering").
50. Financial Action Task Force, More About the FATF and Its Work,
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATFen.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
51. Gregory, supra note 11, at 32.
52. Id. at 31-32.
53. Id. at 33.
54. Id.; see FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REVIEW OF THE FATF
FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS CONSULTATION PAPER 97-98 (2002), available at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/Review40-en.pdf (summarizing how lawyers have been frequently
linked to money laundering schemes).
55. Gregory, supra note 11, at 33; see also COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON
GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
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consider enlisting these professionals as 'gatekeepers' to the domestic
and international financial and business markets to prevent money
laundering and terrorist financing by, among other things, adopting
certain recommendations promulgated by the FATF."56
Lawyers were targeted by the Gatekeeper Initiative because
the task force recognized an increasingly sophisticated approach by
money launderers as more countries responded to the problem.57 The
task force determined that terrorists were frequently using lawyers to
facilitate money laundering transactions and that this activity could
be detected and deterred by imposing reporting requirements on
lawyers. 58
Some member countries, including New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and Switzerland, implemented the Recommendations not
only for financial institutions, but also for these front-line
professionals to strengthen their anti-money laundering efforts. 59 The
United States, however, has been hesitant to implement the
Gatekeeper Initiative because "the role of lawyers as independent
professionals and their ethical obligations to serve the interests of
their clients objectively run counter to the gatekeeper notion that
lawyers essentially act as government agents. °60 American lawyers
are concerned that complying with the Gatekeeper Initiative "would
have the unintended effect of impairing client compliance with law,
and could potentially undermine the fundamental principles
underlying the legal system in the United States."61
In response to the events of September 11, the task force held a
special meeting to develop a plan to combat terrorist financing.62
CONSULTATION 1 (2002), available at http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf (explaining that the
Gatekeeper Initiative evolved as one of the FATF's anti-money laundering initiatives and "is
directed at certain professionals, including lawyers, accountants and auditors, who are involved
in assisting clients with domestic and international financial transactions and business
dealings").
56. COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION
ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 1 (2002), available at http://
www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 26; Gregory, supra note 11, at 33; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY
LAUNDERING, REVIEW OF THE FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS CONSULTATION PAPER 97-98
(2002), available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/Review40-en.pdf.
60. Kevin L. Shepherd, USA PATRIOT Act and the Gatekeeper Initiative: Surprising
Implications for Transactional Lawyers, A.B.A. PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 30.
61. COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION
ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 4 (2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf.
62. Financial Action Task Force, More About the FATF and Its Work, http://wwwl.
oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF-en.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
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FATF issued Eight Special Recommendations in an effort to "deny
access for terrorists and their supporters to the international financial
system."6 3  These special recommendations included criminalizing
terrorist financing, freezing and confiscating terrorists' assets,
reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism, promoting
international cooperation, and reviewing regulations of non-profit
organizations .64
4. Terrorist Financing Executive Order
On September 24, 2001, prior to passing the Patriot Act,
President George W. Bush issued the Terrorist Financing Executive
Order ("Executive Order") to "starve terrorists of funding, turn them
against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places, and bring
them to justice."65  The order, later codified in the Patriot Act,
expanded the Department of Treasury's power, increased the
government's ability to block U.S. assets being used for terrorism, and
prohibited foreign banks from entering the U.S. market unless they
agreed to freeze assets of terrorists abroad.66
The Executive Order established a Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Entities list of alleged terrorists and terrorist
organizations operating in the United States and across the world. 67
According to the Executive Order, the Secretaries of State and
Treasury could add names to this list of individuals or groups that
posed a threat of committing acts of terrorism. 68 Names were only
added to the list after a thorough process that included: a criminal
investigation, review by the Department of Justice, an opportunity for
administrative appeal for any person or organization that felt it had
been wrongly placed on the list, and the opportunity to appeal the
administrative decision to a Federal Court.69 The United States does
63. Id.
64. Financial Action Task Force, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, http://
wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/SRecsTFen.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
65. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Terrorist Financing
Executive Order (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/print/20010924-2.html.
66. Rause, supra note 9, at 180-81.
67. Id. at 181.
68. Morrison & Foerster, LLP, The Legal Response to the September 11 Attacks: The USA
PATRIOT Act, the Executive Order on Prohibited Dealings with Terrorists, and the EU Directive
on Money Laundering, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update600.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2005).
69. Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, Transcript of Press
Roundtable Concerning Executive Order 13224 Blocking Terrorist Property (Feb. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.un.int/usa/02-016.htm.
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not produce this list on its own; countries across the globe contribute
names and use the list to protect their own economies.70
5. European Union Money Laundering Directive 2001/97/EC
In response to the events of September 11, the European Union
amended its own money laundering directive to cover non-financial
activities and professions.7 1  The Revised Directive extended
requirements "regarding client identification, record keeping and
reporting of suspicious transactions to external accountants and
auditors, real estate agents, notaries, lawyers, dealers in high-value
goods,... auctioneers and casinos."72 The previous directive had
focused on the laundering of drug proceeds; but the amendments
expanded the directive's reach to cover "all serious crimes."73  The
Revised Directive made significant advances in fighting terrorist
financing but still has not closed the loophole for money obtained
through "humanitarian" efforts.7 4
C. The USA PATRIOT Act and Real Estate
The passage of the Patriot Act continued the trend of enacting
anti-terrorism legislation in response to a specific terrorist event or
series of events.7 5 The Patriot Act passed within six weeks of the
September 11 attacks, an unusually quick turnaround for such a long
and complex law.7 6 Few committee hearings were held to discuss the
bill and "no official conference met to reconcile the differences between
70. Rause, supra note 9, at 181-83.
71. Id. at 183.
72. Morrison & Foerster, LLP, The Legal Response to the September 11 Attacks: The USA
PATRIOT Act, the Executive Order on Prohibited Dealings with Terrorists, and the EU Directive
on Money Laundering, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update600.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2005).
73. Id. (recognizing that "the Revised Directive amends Directive 91/308/EEC to broaden
the definition of money laundering and extends its provisions to certain non-financial activities
and professions").
74. See Rause, supra note 9, at 184-85 (explaining that terrorists have used charities to
raise money for humanitarian causes and have also diverted some of the money to finance
terrorist acts). 'The USA PATRIOT Act closes this loophole with respect to money laundering
because its 'provisions apply to all terrorist assets, including legally obtained funds, if intended
for use in planning, committing or concealing a terrorist act.' However all countries do not have
this standard yet." See id. (citing Elise Bean, Summary of Key Anti-Money Laundering
Provisions in Anti-terrorism Bill H.R. 3162/P.L. 107-56, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Nov. 2002,
at 89-90)).
75. ABRAMS, supra note 14, at 10.
76. Id. In the wake of September 11, however, the country was determined to take
significant steps toward eliminating the threat of terrorism in the United States, so the bill
passed with little discussion or controversy. Id.
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the House and Senate bills."77 Instead, a group of administrative
officials met to discuss the differences in the bills and to settle on the
final version, which was over 300 pages long.78
The Patriot Act did not add extensive substance to the existing
anti-terrorism crimes. Rather, it strengthened law enforcement tools
that could be used to attack terrorist groups and activities, expanded
anti-money laundering provisions, and added provisions specifically
related to the events of September 11. 79 The anti-money laundering
provisions were particularly expansive because Congress had reason
to believe that "money laundering, and the defects in financial
transparency on which money launderers rely, [were] critical to the
financing of global terrorism and the provision of funds for terrorist
attacks."80
To launder money, criminals usually organize large sums of
money into smaller sums of money to disguise the magnitude of their
transactions.8' To avoid detection, they deposit these smaller amounts
into banks or use the money to purchase other instruments-including
money orders, real estate, and other investments-and therefore move
the illegally obtained money further from its origin.8 2 Eventually, the
money re-enters the economic system as legitimate funds.8 3
Real estate could be vulnerable to money laundering at all
stages of the process, including in "placement," "layering," and
"integration."8 4  The "placement" stage is the initial stage where
illegally obtained funds are introduced to the financial system. In the
real estate field, cash down payments for the purchase of real estate
are an example of placements.8 5 The "layering" stage is when the
funds are distanced from their source through varying financial
transactions. Examples of layering include buying, selling, or
exchanging multiple pieces of real estate to frustrate tracing the illicit
funds.8 6 Finally, the "integration" stage occurs when the illegal funds
are legitimated. An example of layering is when "real estate is sold by
a money launderer to a bona fide purchaser and the purchaser, or his
or her financial institution, provides the money launderer with a
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 10-11.
80. Patriot Act, supra note 7, § 302.
81. Gregory, supra note 11, at 26.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,569.
85. Id. at 17,570.
86. Id.
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check that the money launderer then has the ability to represent as
the proceeds of a legitimate business transaction."87
Congress recognized that money laundering was financing acts
of terrorism and enacted the Patriot Act to strengthen "the ability of
the government, along with our partners in the financial sector, to
identify dollars flowing through our financial system in support of
nefarious acts, and to prevent new dollars from entering the system. '88
The creation of new lines of communication between financial
institutions and the government through the Patriot Act has enabled
the United States to identify at least 361 individuals and
organizations as terrorists or terrorist supporters and to "freeze and
seize approximately $200 million in terrorist-related assets."89
Pursuant to the Patriot Act, financial institutions are required
to establish anti-money laundering programs, including: "the
development of internal policies, procedures and controls; the
designation of a compliance officer; an ongoing employee training
program; and an independent audit function to test programs."90 The
Secretary of the Treasury was given the authority to impose these
requirements upon different financial institutions while considering
"the extent to which the requirements imposed under this section are
commensurate with the size, location, and activities of the financial
institutions to which such regulations apply."91 Financial institutions
were originally defined in the Bank Secrecy Act and amended by the
Patriot Act to include "persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements," along with twenty-six other financial actors.92
The Secretary of the Treasury delegated the authority to
implement the Bank Secrecy Act, and subsequently Section 352 of the
Patriot Act which applies to real estate, to the Director of the
FinCEN.93 However, on April 29, 2002, and again on November 6,
2002, the FinCEN temporarily exempted certain financial institutions,
including those involved with real estate closings and settlements,
from establishing anti-money laundering programs. 94  These
institutions were originally exempted to allow time to investigate "the
affected industries and to consider the extent to which anti-money
87. Id.
88. John W. Snow, Blood Money, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2004, at A14.
89. Id.
90. Patriot Act, supra note 7, §§ 352(a)(1)(A)-(D).
91. Id. § 352(c).
92. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(U) (2000).
93. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,569.
94. Id.
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laundering program requirements should be applied to them."95 The
exemption of the real estate sector was reconsidered in June of 2003
when the FinCEN issued the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("ANPRM").96
III. ANALYSIS: THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES ASSOCIATED WITH
IMPLEMENTING THE PATRIOT ACT IN THE REAL ESTATE FIELD
A. Section 352 of the Patriot Act and the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
While those involved in real estate closings and settlements
were exempted from establishing the minimum anti-money
laundering programs to comply with Section 352 of the Patriot Act, 97
other financial institutions, including depository institutions, broker
dealers, mutual funds and others, immediately implemented anti-
money laundering programs in an attempt to meet the requirements
of the Patriot Act. 98 Most of the financial institutions implemented
programs that contained:
customer identification procedures, customer due diligence procedures, suspicious
activity reporting procedures and large currency transaction reporting procedures. The
customer identification and customer due diligence procedures are typically risk-based
in nature, meaning the higher the risk-profile of the bank customer or the transaction
itself, the more due diligence that must be performed on that customer.
9 9
Implementing similar anti-money laundering programs in the
real estate sector, however, presented new problems because so many
people are involved in real estate transactions. Furthermore, because
attorneys are frequently involved in these transactions, concerns arose
about interfering with the attorney-client privilege. 100 To answer
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, Regulatory Comment on
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as applied to Real Estate (June 9,
2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/guttmann.pdf.
99. Id.
100. See A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Regulatory Comment on
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as applied to Real Estate (June 9,
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some of the questions surrounding the uncertainty in implementation
of anti-money laundering procedures in real estate, the FinCEN
issued an ANPRM. 10 1
After issuing an ANPRM for the regulation of "persons
involved in real estate closings and settlements," the FinCEN accepted
comments for two months.10 2 The ANPRM defined a real estate
closing or settlement as "the process in which the purchase price is
paid to the seller and title is transferred to the buyer" and recognized
that the process may be carried out in different ways, such as the
parties meeting face to face to conduct the closing or an escrow agent
handling the documents without the parties physically meeting. 10 3
The primary questions asked by the FinCEN included:
(1) what are the money laundering risks in real estate closings and settlements... (2)
how should persons involved in real estate closings and settlements be defined... (3)
should any persons involved in real estate closings or settlements be exempted from
coverage under section 352 land]...(4) how should the anti-money laundering program
requirement for persons involved in real estate closings and settlements be
structured?
104
The agency received over fifty comments from individuals and
large organizations, including the American Bar Association ("ABA"),
American Land Title Association, RE/MAX International, Inc.,
Mortgage Bankers Association, and the National Association of
Realtors.10 5 Many who submitted comments supported the Patriot Act
and the FinCEN's effort to implement the Act on financial
institutions. However, most were hesitant to impose the anti-money
laundering provisions on those involved in the real estate field in the
same way as the provisions had been applied to other financial
institutions.'0 6 Since the close of the comment period, the agency has
remained silent as it continues to analyze the problems related to
implementing an anti-money laundering program in the real estate
industry. 107
2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/belcher.pdf ("imposing the Section 352 AML program
requirements on lawyers would adversely affect the attorney-client privilege and would detract
from the role that lawyers play in assisting members of society to understand and comply with
the rule of law.").
101. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,569-71.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 17,569.
104. Id.
105. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Comments on FinCEN Regulations,
http://www.fincen.gov/reg-352comments.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
106. See sources cited supra note 16.
107. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,569; see also Patriot Act, supra note 7, § 352(a)(1)(C).
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B. Money Laundering Risks in Real Estate Closings and Settlements
According to the ANPRM, the real estate industry was
vulnerable to money laundering at all stages-including placement,
layering, and integration-because the industry dealt in high value
assets.108 For example, a person could buy real estate with a large
cash down payment in order to introduce laundered money into the
financial system at the placement stage.10 9 Then, real estate could be
vulnerable at the layering stage when, for example, the laundered
money was used to purchase a piece of property that was then resold
or swapped a few times to make it more difficult to determine the true
source of the funds. 110 Finally, the real estate industry could be
vulnerable at the integration phase "when real estate [wa]s sold by a
money launderer to a bona fide purchaser and the purchaser, or his or
her financial institution, provide[d] the money launderer with a check
that the money launderer then has the ability to represent as the
proceeds of a legitimate business transaction." '
Many of those commenting on the FinCEN's arguments
regarding the vulnerability of the real estate industry recognized the
risk of money laundering but perceived this risk to be quite low.1 12
First, they argued that real estate is a rather illiquid investment
making it a less effective way to launder money than investing in
stock or depositing the money in a bank account.11 3 Second, money
launderers usually want to retrieve their money quickly from the
legitimate source, but retrieving money from a real estate sale would
be a relatively slow process with extensive paperwork. 14 Some of the
108. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,569.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 17,569 n.6.
111. Id. at 17,569 n.7.
112. American Land Title Association, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 4-8 (June 5, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf; America's Community Bankers, Regulatory Comment on
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 3
(June 10, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.govfbahin.pdf; Premier Title Company, Ltd.,
Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as applied
to Real Estate, at 1-2 (May 23, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.govlbaker.pdf.
113. American Land Title Association, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as applied to Real Estate, at 6-8 (June 5, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf; Dechert LLP, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as applied to Real Estate, at 3-4 (June 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.govlkalogredis.pdf.
114. See sources cited supra note 113.
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paperwork would require client identification and the performance of
due diligence measures when financial institutions were partially
financing the sale. 115 Further, the transaction would be reflected in
the public records.11 6 Therefore, little opportunity would exist for the
buyer or seller to remain anonymous.11 7 Finally, current safeguards
require substantial investigation of "the buyer's authority and ability
to perform the transaction, as well as the investigation of the
condition and performance of the real estate."118 These safeguards
already provide significant protection from money laundering in the
real estate field.
In the face of widespread industry skepticism, the ANPRM
offered examples of each stage of money laundering in the context of
real estate transactions.1 9 In the first example, detailed in United
States v. High, 20 the defendants owned and operated a real estate
business that they used to enable drug dealers to convert their illicit
proceeds into real estate assets by structuring the transactions to stay
below the reporting requirement of $10,000 in cash. The FinCEN also
cited United States v. Leslie,12' in which a defendant used his own
real estate company to exchange drug funds in cash for checks from
the real estate business that were supposed to be used to buy real
estate. No real estate was actually purchased or sold, however, so the
money laundering occurred through the issuance of the check from the
business account. 122 The final example was United States v. Nattier, 23
in which the defendants managed a real estate investment firm and
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 4 (June 6, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/kempner.pdf; see also Dechert LLP, Regulatory Comment on
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 3-4
(June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/kalogredis.pdf (mentioning the current
existence of "multiple avenues of due diligence scrutiny performed by diverse parties" in
commercial real estate transactions that render them "an improbable vehicle for money
laundering").
119. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,569-70
120. 117 F.3d 464 (11th Cir. 1997).
121. 103 F.3d 1093 (2d Cir. 1997).
122. Id. at 1096-97; see also National Association of Realtors, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2
(November 6, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/whatley.pdf (noting that in United States
v. Leslie, "the defendant claimed that he intended to purchase property with the illegal funds,
but he was convicted for exchanging ill-gotten cash for checks. Any company with a checking
account is subject to abuse in the same manner").
123. 127 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1997).
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one of the defendants embezzled funds from a bank where he worked
and deposited the money into his co-defendants' business account.
Using the embezzled money, the defendants then purchased property
in order to disguise the embezzled funds.1 24
Although each of these cases involved real estate and money
laundering in some manner, none demonstrated situations in which
money laundering would have been prevented had the proposed anti-
money laundering regulations been in place. 125 In all of these cases,
the defendants, usually real estate business owners, knowingly
participated in money laundering schemes and purposely structured
the transactions to avoid appearing suspicious, while disguising the
laundered funds as legitimate through real estate or a check from the
real estate business. Because of their employment with real estate
companies, these defendants would probably have been at least
partially responsible for carrying out the requirements of the anti-
money laundering program. This would have included the utilization
of customer due diligence and investigation of the legitimacy of the
funds. In all likelihood, the defendants in these cases would not have
turned themselves in to the authorities.
Though the cases mentioned in the AMPRM fail to
demonstrate a likely risk for real estate transactions to be utilized for
money laundering, more recent cases do demonstrate this risk. For
example, in United States v. Messino,126 the defendant laundered
money at the placement stage by purchasing real estate from a seller
in installment payments with drug proceeds over twelve to fifteen
months. 127 In this case, the defendant bought a piece of land through
124. Id. at 658-59; see also National Association of Realtors, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2
(November 6, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/whatley.pdf (establishing that "using the
embezzled funds, defendants purchased property through the account of the investment firm in
an attempt to launder the funds.").
125. See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2-3, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/mills.pdf (recognizing that in these cases the defendants were directly
involved in the criminal scheme and noting that the Treasury needed to take a closer look at the
true risk of traditional real estate transactions being used for money laundering); National
Association of Realtors, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (November 6, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/whatley.pdf (mentioning that in each of these cases "the principals of real
estate companies willingly participated in the criminal enterprise and were convicted as
criminals"). Cf. American Land Title Association, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 5-6 (June 5, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf (asserting that no real estate closers were
actually involved in these money laundering transactions).
126. 382 F.3d 704, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2004).
127. Id.
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an oral sale and organized the sale so that his name was not attached
to the real estate transaction. He then manipulated an attorney into
drawing up the closing documents without his name included on
them. 128 The defendant paid $40,000 for the property over a few
months in $7,000 installments, avoiding the IRS reporting
requirements that would attach upon receipt of a $10,000 cash
payment. 129 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the
district court's decision, decided that this transaction looked
suspicious because it was marked by "unusual secrecy surrounding
transactions, careful structuring of transactions to avoid attention,
folding or otherwise depositing illegal profits into the bank account or
receipts of legitimate business, use of third parties to conceal the real
owner, or engaging in unusual financial moves culminating in a
transaction."130
Similarly, in United States v. Bivins,131 the defendants utilized
traditional real estate transactions to place drug money in the
legitimate financial arena by purchasing property. The appellate
court upheld the defendants' conviction for money laundering
conspiracy because they used drug proceeds to buy real estate in order
to conceal the illegitimacy of their funds. 132 In both examples of
money laundering at the placement stage, anti-money laundering
procedures probably would have caused the defendants' actions to be
reported since further investigation might have aroused suspicion.
Real estate transactions have also been used to hide illegally
obtained money at the layering stage. For example, in 2002, in United
States. v. Gricco, a defendant's conviction for money laundering was
upheld by the Third Circuit which found that the defendant deposited
$169,000 over three years into bank accounts and disguised the
laundered money through real estate purchases.13 3  The court
determined that the defendant "structured his currency transactions,
laundered money through real estate purchases, and hid assets under
family members' names."'134 These crimes could possibly have been
avoided through further investigation and anti-money laundering
procedure of the real estate process.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 711.
130. Id. at 712 (citing United States v. Esterman, 324 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2003) for the
Esterman standard of intention to conceal).
131. 104 Fed. Appx. 892 (4th Cir. 2004).
132. Id. at 896-97.
133. United States. v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 2002).
134. Id. at 361.
[Vol. 58:5:17051724
2005] NO LOOPHOLES FOR TERRORIST FINANCING
Similarly, in United States v. 1948 South Martin Luther King
Drive, the defendant utilized complex real estate transactions in the
layering stage to aid in money laundering. 135 The defendant admitted
to using drug proceeds to purchase numerous properties in family
members' names to disguise the true nature of the funding. 136 Deeper
investigation of the finances used to purchase the real estate could
possibly have prevented the crime.
Though some cases indicate that anti-money laundering
programs would not have prevented the crimes, other cases
demonstrate that real estate remains at least somewhat vulnerable to
money launderers because the transactions involve highly valued
assets.137 Though real estate is less liquid than other assets, and
transactions are more difficult to keep anonymous, 38 heavy regulation
of other assets makes it more likely that criminals will utilize real
estate transactions to legitimize their funds. 139 If history is a guide, as
soon as safeguards are implemented to protect certain financial
avenues from money laundering, criminals will seek other openings to
place, layer, and integrate their laundered funds. 40
C. Defining "Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and
Settlements"
Many people are involved in real estate closings and
settlements, including real estate brokers, attorneys, banks, mortgage
brokers or other financing entities, title insurance companies, escrow
agents, and appraisers. 141 Yet, neither the Patriot Act nor its
legislative history defines the phrase "persons involved in real estate
135. 270 F.3d 1102 (7th Cir. 2001).
136. Id. at 1112-13.
137. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,569; see also American Land Title Association, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate at 7 (June 5, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf (stating that "it is undeniable that real estate
can be used for integration, as can any other traditional asset.").
138. Dechert LLP, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 3 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.
fincen.gov/kalogredis.pdf.
139. America's Community Bankers, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 1-2 (June 10, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/bahin.pdf.
140. For instance, money launderers routinely deposited cash in amounts less than $10,000
to avoid the reporting requirements and then transferred the resulting laundered funds into
international bank accounts. Gregory, supra note 11, at 27, 33.
141. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,570.
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closings and settlements."'142 The FinCEN offered as a "guiding
principle in defining the phrase" that its definition should "include
those persons whose services rendered or products offered in
connection with a real estate closing or settlement... can be abused by
money launderers."'143 Many comment letters supported a specific and
narrow definition of the phrase to ensure effective enforcement of the
provision. 144
The FinCEN has not yet defined the phrase but has indicated
that it will do so in the near future. 145 The FinCEN must balance
many factors in determining whom to incorporate under the
definition, including ability to identify the purpose and nature of the
transaction, importance to successful completion of the transaction,
roles in the money laundering transaction, and finally, "involvement
with the actual flow of funds used to purchase the property."'146
Deciding whom to include in the definition will be key in establishing
this procedure in the real estate sector because the breadth of the
definition will determine how many people the Act affects.
D. Exempting from Coverage Those who are Involved in Real
Estate Closings and Settlements
1. General Exemptions for Those Involved in Real Estate Closings and
Settlements
The FinCEN also solicited comments regarding which entities
should be exempt from the law in the real estate sector. The FinCen
hypothesized that financial institutions, which were already subject to
anti-money laundering programs in other areas, as well as those
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 5-6 (June
9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/belcher.pdf; Mortgage Bankers Association of
America, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352
as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (June 6, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/kempner.pdf;
The Real Estate Roundtable, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 4-5 (June 6, 2003) available at
http://www.fincen.gov/deboer.pdf.
145. See Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra
note 47, at 17,571 (attempting to establish "which participants in the real estate closing or
settlement process are in a position where they can effectively identify and guard against money
laundering in such transactions").
146. Id. at 17,570.
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parties who purchase and sell their own real estate, should be
exempt. 147 The agency sought comments on this subject specifically
from "real estate professionals and those who trade[d] in real estate on
a commercial basis. ' 148 Mortgage companies, small proprietors and
sole practitioners, settlement agents, small banks, qualified
intermediaries, real estate licensees, real estate brokers, title
abstractors, inspectors, surveyors, appreciators, attorneys, purchasers,
and sellers were all mentioned as possible exemptions in the comment
letters.
While the Mortgage Bankers Association of America ("MBA")
claimed to support the FinCEN's goal of eliminating terrorist
financing through the Patriot Act, it expressed concern regarding the
implementation of the requirements of the Act on the real estate
sector. 149 It hypothesized that this would result in higher costs for
training, implementation, and auditing, which could lead to confusion
and less effective implementation. 150  Since banks, savings
associations, mortgage companies, and mortgage brokers were
"already covered or will be covered by a separate rule," MBA argued
that all of these entities should be exempted from coverage in the real
estate sector. 15' MBA agreed with the FinCEN's suggestion in the
ANPRM to exempt those already required to implement anti-money
laundering programs in other areas. 152
Many arguing for exemptions were concerned that the
increased costs associated with the implementation of anti-money
laundering programs would outweigh the minimal benefits realized.
They worried that the costs of this increased regulation would
ultimately be passed on to consumers and negatively impact real
estate development. 53  For example, the American Land Title
Association recommended an exemption for small proprietorships and
sole practitioners, including title insurance agents and abstractors,
who served as real estate closers because these businesses would be
147. Id. at 17,571.
148. Id.
149. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 6-7 (June 6, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/kempner.pdf.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Escrow Institute of California, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 9 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/pothier.pdf.
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too small to shoulder the increased costs. 154 The Escrow Institute of
California also advocated exempting settlement agents because they
were already subject to reporting requirements for certain cash
transactions. 155
Others recommended exemptions for certain individuals who
operated on the periphery of transactions and did not possess enough
information about the financial transaction to serve as legitimate
safeguards to prevent money laundering. Attorneys' Title Guaranty
Fund, Inc. encouraged exemption for title insurance companies
because they were "typically limited to providing information about
matters appearing in the public record" and therefore usually had
"little or no information about the structure of the transaction."156
Because title insurance companies supposedly did not have most of
the vital information for detecting money laundering, the Attorneys'
Title Guaranty Fund argued that the costs of including title insurance
companies in "persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements" outweighed the benefits.157  Further, since title
abstractors, inspectors, and surveyors were not typically involved in
handling the funds of a real estate transaction, Premier Title
Company, Ltd., argued those groups should be exempted from the
anti-money laundering regulation.158 Similarly, since appraisers were
"not in the position to assist in the conversion of illegal money to a
tangible asset," the Appraisal Institute argued these individuals
should also be exempted from coverage. 5 9  Likewise, real estate
licensees were rarely involved with the flow and distribution of funds
in a real estate transaction, according to RE/MAX International, Inc.,
154. American Land Title Association, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 9-10 (June 5, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf.
155. Escrow Institute of California, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 8-9 (June 9, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/pothier.pdf.
156. Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/birnbaum.pdf.
157. Id. at 3.
158. Premier Title Company, Ltd., Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (May 23, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/baker.pdf.
159. Appraisal Institute/American Society of Appraisers, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2-3 (Nov.
6, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/hummel.pdf.
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and were therefore in an inferior position to identify potential sources
of money laundering. 160
The FinCEN suggested that purchasers and sellers of their
own real estate should be exempted from coverage, 161 but that idea
received mixed reactions. The American Bar Association ("ABA")
agreed that some buyers and sellers should be exempted but disagreed
with the broad exemption set forth by the FinCEN.162 The ABA
expressed concerns that people with less knowledge of financing
transactions may be responsible for shouldering the burden of
compliance, while the buyer or seller would be in a better position to
fulfill these requirements. 163  Yet, the ABA suggested that an
exemption should "apply to purchasers and sellers of their own
personal residences and to other real estate professionals involved in a
commercial real estate transaction who have only a tangential
relationship with the closing or settlement process."164  Conversely,
the Navy Federal Credit Union agreed with the exemption set forth by
the FinCEN and urged the agency to consider expanding the
exemption to include those "persons or entities appointed to represent
buyers or sellers."165
2. The Debate about Attorney Exemptions
The most controversial topic in the ANPRM was the possibility
of exempting attorneys from compliance with the anti-money
laundering requirements in the real estate field. The debate focused
on whether attorneys played a substantial enough role in real estate
transactions to recognize money laundering activities and whether an
attorney's unique position warranted infringing upon the attorney-
client privilege to prevent money laundering and, perhaps, terrorist
160. RE/MAX International, Inc., Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2-3 (May 27, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/jesperson.pdf.
161. Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra note
47, at 17,571.
162. A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 11-12
(June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/belcher.pdf.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id. at 12.
165. Navy Federal Credit Union, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/earner.pdf.
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financing.166 Many argued chat attorneys played a key role in real
estate closings and settlements and that they were usually intimately
familiar with the financing and transactional details of the deal. 167
Others responded that despite the attorneys' arguably substantial role
in real estate transactions, the costs of infringing upon the attorney-
client privilege would far outweigh the benefits of imposing anti-
money laundering requirements on attorneys. 168
The opponents to regulating attorneys in the real estate field
argued that one of the primary costs of regulation would be
infringement on the attorney-client privilege, which is the oldest
communication common law privilege. 169 The privilege is meant to
"encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients," which in turn "promotes broader public interests in the
observance of law and the administration of justice."' 70 According to
the American Bar Association's Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation,
"the independence of the bar, the role of the lawyer as a counselor and
expert in the meaning of laws, and the right to effective legal
assistance form the basis for the system of justice and administration
of law in the United States."1 71 The United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of an independent bar as a
166. The frequency and significance of the attorney's role in a real estate transaction is quite
debatable, especially when in many states a lawyer's participation is not even necessary to
complete a real estate transaction. As an example, attorneys only participate in residential real
estate transactions approximately 40 percent of the time. Michael Braunstein, Structural
Change and Inter-Professional Competitive Advantage: An Example Drawn from Residential Real
Estate Conveyancing, 62 MO. L. REV. 241, 241 (1997).
167. See Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, supra
note 47, at 17,571 (recognizing that "attorneys often play a key role in real estate closings and
settlements").
168. See A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Regulatory Comment on
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 7-10
(June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/belcher.pdf (arguing that current safeguards of
ethical rules were already in place and "imposing the Section 352 AML program requirements on
lawyers would adversely affect the attorney-client privilege and would detract from the role that
lawyers play in assisting members of society to understand and comply with the rule of law");
American College of Real Estate Lawyers, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 7-11 (June 9, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/weiner.pdf.
169. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
170. Id.; COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE
PROFESSION ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 8 (2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf; American College of Real Estate Lawyers, Regulatory
Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real
Estate, at 9 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/weiner.pdf.
171. COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION
ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 6 (2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf.
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basis for the proper functioning of the American justice system. 172 In
this way, attorneys serve as "gatekeepers to the system of justice and
administration of law for citizens of the United States and other
countries."173
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, as well as the ethical rules adopted by each state, 174 support
the notion that "the duties of loyalty and confidentiality remain
bedrock principles of the attorney-client relationship, and promote the
independence of attorneys and the adversarial system. ' 175 The loyalty
duty, described in Model Rule 1.2, requires attorneys to accept and
follow the client's decisions unless the attorney knows the client's
decisions are unlawful or unethical. 7 6  The confidentiality duty,
described in Model Rule 1.6(a), with limited exception, prohibits
attorneys "from revealing information relating to the representation of
a client unless the client gives informed consent."'77 The comments
relating to this rule further explain the trust between the attorney
and the client, based on the attorney's loyalty and confidentiality:
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the
client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the
representation... This contributes to the trust that is that hallmark of the client-lawyer
relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
172. See, e.g., Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001); In re Criminal
Contempt of Thomas C. McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962); see also COMMENTS OF THE ABA
TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE CONSULTATION 6 (2002), available at http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf (recognizing
that "the independence of the bar, the role of the lawyer as a counselor and expert in the
meaning of laws, and the right to effective legal assistance form the basis for the system of
justice and administration of law in the United States").
173. COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION
ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 7 (2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf.
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id. at 7.
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983); see also COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK
FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE CONSULTATION 7 (2002), available at http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf (stating that
Model Rule 1.2 requires "the attorney to abide by the client's decisions unless the attorney knows
the client's conduct is unlawful or unethical").
177. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983); COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE
ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
CONSULTATION 7 (2002), available at http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf; American College of
Real Estate Lawyers, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 10 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/weiner.pdf.
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damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client
effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. 
1 78
Some of the suggested requirements of the Patriot Act may infringe
upon this attorney-client privilege. Strict reporting requirements of
the Act could transform attorneys into quasi-government agents,
potentially damaging the trust built upon the confidentiality and
loyalty of the attorney-client privilege. 179 As the American College of
Real Estate Lawyers noted in its Comment Letter to the FinCEN,
Logically, a client will not consult with an attorney if the client suspects the attorney
has an obligation to report the client to law enforcement authorities (e.g. in a criminal
setting) or divulge the client's confidences to a counterparty (e.g. in a commercial
setting). In a 1996 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
pointedly noted "[the] valuable social service of counseling clients and bringing them
into compliance with the law cannot be performed effectively if clients are scared to tell
their lawyers what they are doing, for fear that their lawyers will be turned into
government informants." 
18 0
Several other concerns arise under the proposal that Section
352 be applied to attorneys acting within the real estate sector.
Insofar as the Act's suggested policies and procedures would require
attorneys to investigate their clients' backgrounds, intentions, or
business dealings, the Act could inappropriately interfere with the
attorney-client privilege by forcing the lawyer to become adverse to his
client's interests. 8 1 While it is appropriate for a lawyer to prepare
adequately for a transaction and question the relevant facts his client
presents, an attorney should not have the duty to "audit" the dealings
of his client.18 2 Further, under the current system, attorneys are only
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) cmt. 2 (1983). The attorney-client privilege,
however, only allows attorneys to act as zealous advocates for their clients within ethical bounds.
For example, the privilege does not apply when the "client made or received the communication
with the intent to further an unlawful or fraudulent act, and the client ultimately carries out the
crime or the fraud." COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE
PROFESSION ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 8 (2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf.
179. Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 1 (June 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/hogan.pdf (noting that the implementation of Section 352
AML requirements on attorneys would convert them into "de facto government agents").
180. American College of Real Estate Lawyers, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 10 (June 9, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/weiner.pdf (quoting United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir.
1996)).
181. A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 8 (June 9,
2003), available at http://www.fincen.govbelcher.pdf.
182. Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, Regulatory Comment on
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 8
(June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/guttmann.pdf.
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required to break the attorney-client privilege and report to public
officials when they reasonably believe a crime might occur. 8 3 But the
Patriot Act's expanded reporting requirements could convert lawyers
into de facto government informants by requiring them also to report
suspicious activity of their clients. 8 4 Additionally, an independent
audit of the anti-money laundering program would require the auditor
to examine the attorney's files, thereby breaching the confidentiality
between attorney and client. 85
Sarbanes Oxley established a heightened degree of reporting
for attorneys but not to the extent proposed by the Patriot Act.
Section 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act expanded the federal exceptions
to the strict confidence of attorney-client privilege. 8 6 However, it did
not require attorneys to investigate, audit, or conduct due diligence on
their clients. 8 7  Rather, the law enlarged the traditional crime
prevention exception to the attorney-client privilege by requiring
attorneys who practiced before the SEC on behalf of public companies
to report "evidence" of a "material violation" of securities laws or a
"breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation" by the issuer up-the-
ladder within the company to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company. If those officers do not respond
appropriately to the evidence, the attorney is required to report the
evidence to the audit committee, to another committee of independent
directors, or to the full board of directors. 88
Safeguards currently in place to protect attorneys from
involvement with money launderers include the rules of ethics as well
as other types of reporting requirements. 8 9 The ethical provisions
protecting attorneys include the primary exception to the Model Rules
regarding attorney-client privilege and confidentiality whereby
attorneys are encouraged to break confidentiality to report suspicious
activity to the authorities when it would prevent a crime from
183. Id. at 9.
184. Id.
185. A.B.A. Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate (June 9,
2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/belcher.pdf.
186. National Association of Bar-Related Title Insurers, Regulatory Comment on the
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 3-4 (June
9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/elliott.pdf (citing Securities and Exchange
Commission, Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Final Rule, 68
Fed. Reg. 6,296 (Feb. 6, 2003)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. COMMENTS OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION AND THE PROFESSION
ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE CONSULTATION 9-10 (2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/krauland.pdf.
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occurring.190 Most states have adopted a similar version of this Model
Rule, and "in many states, a lawyer is authorized (but not required) to
disclose client misconduct when the lawyer 'reasonably believes' it
necessary to avoid 'substantial injury' to the person or property of
another. In four states, such disclosure is mandatory."'191 In addition,
attorneys are required by federal law to report the receipt of any
amount of cash over $10,000 on an IRS Form 8300. This requires the
disclosure of the source of funds and whether the source is a client.192
Finally, lawyers are also required "to report misconduct by their
clients when a failure to do so would constitute fraud on a tribunal."' 93
Others argue attorneys should be exempt to avoid a duplication
of efforts, delays in the closing process, and increased expenses for the
client. 94 First, in those instances when real estate transactions are
financed in cash, attorneys are already subject to the IRS cash
reporting requirements. 195 Traditional financial institutions usually
have already fulfilled some of the reporting requirements by the
closing of the transaction, and when attorneys are presented with
money at closing, they are required to report large payments
regardless of further Patriot Act regulation:
Most funds received by real estate attorneys come in the form of: (i) wire transfers
inbound from a U.S. depository institution or from a U.S. correspondent of a non-U.S.
bank; or (ii) checks or similar negotiable instruments. By the time purchasers and
sellers come to the closing table they have already visited their respective banks... In
this respect, other financial institutions who already are required under Section 352 to
have AML programs in place perform basic Know Your Customer (KYC) on the
customer and, if appropriate, the source of funds. 
1 9 6
190. Id.
191. Id. at 9.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 10; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer who
learns, during the course of a proceeding, that he or she has offered false evidence to the tribunal
to take remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary).
194. Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 3-4 (June 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/hogan.pdf.
195. Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, Regulatory Comment on
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 4
(June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/guttmann.pdf.
196. Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 3 (June 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/hogan.pdf; National Association of Bar-Related Title Insurers,
Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied
to Real Estate, at 6-7 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/elliott.pdl; Real Property
Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 6 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/iverson.pdf.
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In terms of delays in the closing process, if the additional procedures
were implemented for real estate transactions, "common and
relatively straightforward legal transactions [could be turned] into a
protracted process."'197 Finally, adding these policies and procedures,
hiring compliance officers, training employees, and conducting
independent audits would be expensive. 19 The significant increase in
costs would ultimately fall on the consumer, 199 eventually hurting the
real estate industry. This result would be extremely undesirable
since the real estate industry has been one of the most economically
stable industries since September 11, 2001.200
E. Suggestions for Implementation of Regulation on "Persons Involved
in Real Estate Closings and Settlements"
Commentators offered numerous proposals regarding how to
structure the implementation of anti-money laundering provisions of
the Patriot Act in the real estate field, ranging from no further
regulation of real estate,20' to strict regulation similar to that already
imposed upon more traditional financial institutions.20 2 As previously
discussed, the FinCEN must consider a variety of factors because
regulating the real estate sector presents unique problems that did
197. Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 3 (June 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.govhogan.pdf; National Association of Bar-Related Title Insurers,
Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied
to Real Estate, at 7-8 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/elliott.pdf, Real Property
Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 6-7 (June 9, 2003), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/iverson.pdf.
198. See sources cited supra note 196.
199. Id.; Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, Regulatory
Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real
Estate, at 5 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/guttmann.pdf.
200. Dechert LLP, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.
fincen.gov/kalogredis.pdf.
201. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 7-8 (June 6, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/kempner.pdf.
202. See American Financial Services Association Consumer Mortgage Coalition, Regulatory
Comment on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real
Estate, at 2, 6 (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.fincen.gov/americanfinancial.pdf ("[T]he
AML program requirements FinCEN has published for banks and broker-dealers are an
appropriate model, to which the AML program requirements of persons involved in real estate
closings and settlements should closely conform.").
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not arise when the FinCEN implemented Section 352 on other
financial institutions. 20 3
IV. SOLUTION: DESIGNATION OF ONE PRIMARY PERFORMER OF ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING PROCEDURES FROM A PRE-ARRANGED LIST OF
ACTORS FOR EACH TRANSACTION
A. Closing All Possible Loopholes to Prevent Terrorist Financing
Though the risk of money laundering in real estate
transactions may be lower than in other areas, the possibility of abuse
does exist and this field should not remain unregulated. As at-risk
areas become more heavily regulated, money launderers will search
for alternative outlets for use in placing their illicit funds in the
legitimate financial system. 204 Therefore, real estate could be the next
target for money launderers.
B. Designating One Participant to Comply with Money Laundering
Rules
In imposing Section 352 of the Patriot Act on "persons involved
in real estate closings and settlements," the FinCEN should mandate
the designation of a "primary compliance participant": one participant
in the transaction who is responsible for complying with anti-money
laundering procedures. Then, other participants in the transaction
could reasonably rely on that primary participant's completion of the
procedures. Although the number, identity, and role of participants in
real estate transactions vary,20 5 an established order of designees as
primary compliance participants would be the most effective means of
deciding which party bears the burden of compliance. This system
would also limit the possibility of neglecting to designate someone as
primary compliance participant and prevent drawn-out negotiations
regarding who should shoulder the responsibility.
This system would also be the most effective way to avoid
duplicative efforts, to minimize costs that would eventually transfer to
the client, and to maintain the economic stability of the real estate
field. In essence, it would be the least cost avoidance solution. By
203. See discussion infra Part III.A.
204. Gregory, supra note 11, at 27-30 (evidencing that money launderers structured their
deals to avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement and then began taking advantage of foreign
banks when U.S. laws took a stronger approach in eliminating the problem).
205. See generally 15 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 84C.01 (2004).
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placing the burden of compliance with one participant in the
transaction, duplicative due diligence efforts would not be required.
C. Deciding Which Participant to Designate
The most complicated aspect of implementation would involve
determining who is in the best position to fill the role as primary
compliance participant. FinCEN should codify a list, which would
dictate the order in every real estate transaction. The first entity or
person on the list should be selected to be primarily responsible for
compliance, unless that entity or person is not a participant in the
particular transaction. If the latter is the case, then one would move
down the list until reaching a person or entity involved in the
transaction.20 6
First on the list should be banks and other traditional financial
institutions. These institutions are uniquely suited to investigate
clients' backgrounds, are distinctively familiar with the details of the
transactions, and are already subject to the compliance regulations.20 7
Since they are already required to comply with the anti-money
laundering provisions of the Patriot Act, it would not make sense for
someone else involved in the transaction to duplicate their efforts.
Furthermore, traditional financial institutions would be in a
particularly appropriate position to fill the role of primary compliance
participants because they are involved in most real estate
transactions.
Title insurance companies should be second on the list to bear
the responsibility of compliance. They are involved in a significant
206. The list was compiled as simply as possible, but it is not always clear which parties are
involved in real estate transactions. Although title insurance companies are identified separately
from escrow agents, there are transactions where those roles would be played by the same
individual or company. Further, in many situations, multiple brokers would be involved,
including a listing agent broker, broker for the seller who finds the purchaser, and the buyer's
broker; therefore, a specific order amongst those participating parties would also need to be
established to avoid ambiguity in the line of duty.
207. See American College of Mortgage Attorneys, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2-3 (June 6, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.govfbromberg.pdf (arguing that it would be more sensible to
"impose the requirements of the proposed rule only on those 'financial institutions' that are
customarily and directly involved in providing or handling funds at commercial real estate
purchase and financing transactions," and "most of these loans involved funding by financial
institutions that are already subject to anti-laundering and related governmental scrutiny and
reporting requirements"). Cf. Navy Federal Credit Union, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 1 (June 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/earner.pdf (pointing out the lender's unique ability "to identify
potential borrower abuses" because of its review in determining the individual's credit
worthiness).
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number of real estate transactions and would be better able to bear
the costs than the escrow agent. 208  Although title insurance
companies usually only investigate information contained in public
records, under these new regulations, they would be required to
institute anti-money laundering programs as well to conduct further
due diligence on the client.209 Admittedly, this would be rather costly.
Those costs, however, would ultimately fall upon the client, regardless
of who is charging for them.
Escrow agents are the next best positioned to act as primary
compliance participants. They are responsible for the funds in a real
estate transaction and would therefore already be familiar with the
financial details of the transaction.
Fourth in line should be real estate brokers and agents. These
parties know the client and possibly the sources of financing, and
would be able to implement procedures to further investigate the
entire transaction and the seller.210
As a last resort, attorneys should bear the responsibility for
compliance. Although attorneys are usually knowledgeable regarding
the details of the transaction, an exception to the strict confidentiality
of attorney-client privilege should be made only on rare occasions. By
keeping attorneys at the end of the line, the attorney-client privilege,
a cornerstone of American justice, remains duly protected. Attorneys
should not be exempted from this process altogether because they do
possess important information regarding the deal and the clients; if
this system is to be effective, all gaps and loopholes must be closed
from money launderers and terrorists.
Finally, if none of these key entities or people are involved in a
given real estate transaction, the burden of compliance should remain
on all involved parties. In order to ensure compliance, the government
should also implement a penalty or strict fine system to penalize
parties for failure to comply. The penalty should be higher for the
primarily responsible party but should be shared among all parties
208. See Escrow Institute of California, Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 9 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/pothier.pdf ("[S]ettlement agents are already subject to reporting
requirements on cash transactions . . . [and] to also impose additional rules on the escrow
companies, who primarily are composed of small businesses and who do not participate in
structuring the real estate deals, will result in higher costs to the consumers without a
reasonable expectation that money laundering will be detected or prevented.").
209. Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., Regulatory Comment on the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Section 352 as Applied to Real Estate, at 2 (June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/birnbaum.pdf.
210. As many as three brokers could be involved in any one real estate transaction, including
the listing agent, the seller's broker, and the buyer's broker; the FinCEN could do further
research to determine which of those parties could most effectively bear the compliance burden.
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involved in the transaction because ultimately, all parties are
responsible for ensuring compliance.
D. How to Comply
In order to comply with the Patriot Act, the parties to a real
estate transaction would follow the requirements in the FinCEN's
regulation. First, those involved must determine which party should
be responsible for compliance with anti-money laundering procedures.
After designating a primary compliance participant from the above
list, the remaining parties would sign an agreement indicating their
reasonable reliance on the designee's effective and proper compliance
with the anti-money laundering provisions. 21' This agreement would
ensure that the primary compliance participant would recognize and
be reminded of its duty, and it would allow the other parties to
recognize that, for this transaction, they do not need to perform those
duties. It would also be reasonable for the others to rely on the
primary designee's performance of those duties after this agreement
was signed.
The Patriot Act requires that each financial institution
establish, at a minimum, certain internal policies and procedures to
protect itself against money laundering.212  Designation of a
compliance officer, organization of an employee training program, and
an independent audit function ensure the programs are effective. 21 3 In
establishing internal policies and procedures, it is extremely
important for the financial institution to ensure that it is "not doing
business with any person, entity or group (including officers, directors,
partners, members with 25 percent or more ownership interest) listed
as a terrorist or terrorist entity on the SDN [Specially Designated
Nationals]. list."214
Application of this provision to the real estate sector dictates
that the most effective way to ensure that the financial institution
avoids doing business with anyone on the list is for the designated
compliance officer of the primarily responsible party in the real estate
211. This agreement is similar to the written confirmation of due diligence suggested in
Kevin L. Shepherd, The USA PATRIOT Act: The Complexities of Imposing Anti-Money
Laundering Obligations on the Real Estate Industry, 39 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 403, 437-38
(2004).
212. Patriot Act, supra note 7, §§ 352(a)(1)(A)-(D).
213. Id.
214. Tara K. Gorman, Do You Look Good in Prison Stripes? USA PATRIOT Act and Anti-
Terrorism Laws - Real Estate Industry: Stand Up and Take Notice, PROP. WRITES, Oct. 5, 2004,
at 8, available at http://www.hklaw.com/Publications/Newsletters.asp?IssueID=504&Article=
2739.
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transaction to utilize a computer software program that tracks names
on the SDN list.215 If the program recognizes one of the party names
as suspicious, the party responsible for compliance should conduct
further due diligence to determine whether it was a SDN list "hit",
what the quality of the "hit" was, and how much other information
regarding the party matches the information of the SDN listed
party. 216 If the party matches the listed party, then the compliance
officer should report the information to the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") Compliance Programs Division. 217
To meet the other requirements of the statute, all parties in the
real estate transaction would be required to establish ongoing
employee training programs and independent audit functions. The
financial institution would need to provide its employees with an
overview of money laundering, including instruction on how to detect
suspicious activity and how to avoid being drawn into the situation.
The financial institution should continue this training as warranted
by new development in techniques to avoid money laundering.
Finally, the financial institutions involved in real estate transactions
would need to hire an independent auditor who would periodically
ensure that the regulations are being effectively implemented.
Some of the penalties for noncompliance with Executive Order
13224 and OFAC regulations are rather harsh.218 The penalties
should be fine-tuned to ensure that the Patriot Act is implemented
most effectively in the real estate sector. Currently, willful violations
carry "fines of $25,000 per day civilly or up to $250,000 per day for a
willful criminal violation," and, "[a] company can also be criminally
liable for up to $500,000 for willful violations of the Act if the company
is involved in a pattern of illegal activity involving more than
$100,000."219 The Patriot Act also increased the opportunity for
enforcement through the use of "civil and/or criminal penalties for
violations of the due diligence requirements for the United States
private banking and correspondent accounts (previously covered by
the BSA) to 'not less than two times the amount of the [illegal]
transaction, but not more than $1,000,000."'22 0
Financial institutions would also continue to be protected by
the safe harbor provisions for suspicious activity reporting that were
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 8-9.
218. Id. at 9.
219. Steptoe & Johnson LLP, The USA PATRIOT Act and Financial Institutions,
http://www.steptoe.com/publications/PI3052.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
220. Id.
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first enacted in 1992 and later incorporated into the FinCEN.221
Recently, "several courts have disagreed about the scope of the
protection afforded by this safe harbor provision," but a May 2004
interagency advisory report recognized that a majority of courts have
ruled that "the safe harbor provision provides unqualified protection
to financial institutions and their employees from civil liability for
filing a SAR [suspicious activity report]."222 The report delineated
that
communicating with law enforcement authorities through these processes, or in
response to a subpoena from federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies or other
forms of compulsory process, such as a request from FinCEN pursuant to section 314(a)
of the USA PATRIOT Act or the reporting of a blocked transaction to the U.S.
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, will provide maximum
legal protection for financial institutions.
2 2 3
This same kind of maximum legal protection extended to financial
institutions in filing suspicious activity reports should extend to the
real estate field and the parties who file these reports.
E. Costs and Benefits of Proposal
Imposing the anti-money laundering programs on all parties
involved in real estate transactions would facilitate the education of
all parties, enable them to better recognize suspicious activity, and
effectively prevent money laundering. Accordingly, the definition of
"persons involved in real estate transactions and settlements" should
include all parties involved, or potentially involved, in real estate
transactions, settlements and closings, including banks and other
financial institutions, title insurance companies, real estate brokers
and agents, buyers and sellers, attorneys, and escrow agents. Real
estate actors generally not involved in closings, including appraisers,
surveyors, and title abstractors, should be exempted.
No system will be able to perfectly implement the Patriot Act
in the real estate field, but this proposed solution represents the least-
cost avoidance option. Although this proposal requires everyone
involved in real estate closings and settlements to comply with the
anti-money laundering procedures, compliance with these programs
would not be as expensive as might be projected because they would
not be used frequently by most parties. Although the proposed
221. FDIC, Federal Court Reaffirms Protections for Financial Institutions Filing Suspicious
Activity Reports, http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2004/fi16704a.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2005).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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solution would require training for all involved in real estate
transactions, the costs would most likely be offset or outweighed by
the benefits of preventing money laundering in real estate. Despite
being required to hire a compliance officer or independent auditor,
that person would need to act infrequently because most likely, this
duty would fall on traditional financial institutions that already have
to perform these duties under existing law.
Some might argue that it would not be possible to recognize
whether this regulation was in fact effective in inhibiting terrorist
financing because of the difficulty in determining the actual size and
roots of the money laundering problem. However, it is important to
recognize that money laundering is a significant problem in this
country and real estate remains vulnerable to the crime.224
Others might argue that it would result in the overregulation
of banks. Although banks are already highly regulated and therefore
might oppose heavier regulation, there would not be significantly
higher costs to implementing this system because banks are already
required to do the same kind of due diligence and research on the
transaction.225
Others cite the growing mounds of paperwork accumulating on
regulators' desks because of the Patriot Act as a reason not to impose
the regulation on all parties to a real estate transaction.226 This
paperwork, however, is necessary if the government is to impose
stricter regulations on the field.
Although many would argue it would be more effective to move
lawyers further up the line of responsibility, it is important to
recognize the importance of protecting the attorney-client privilege, as
well as the sporadic involvement of attorneys in real estate
transactions. 227 The necessity of attorney participation in real estate
224. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, About FinCEN/FAQs, http://www
.fincen.gov/affaqs.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
225. See John J. Byrne & Michael D. Kelsey, USA PATRIOT Act: What a Long Trip It Has
Been, available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/201ED198-10FC-4328-A9E870E25
09549A2/3722 1/CoverStory.pdf (discussing the effects of the implementation of the Patriot Act on
the banking industry).
226. Opponents of the Patriot Act have argued that it may cause important information to be
overlooked because of the sheer volume of documentation that is now required. See John Berlaw,
Show Us Your Money: The USA PATRIOT Act Lets the Feds Spy on Your Finances. But Does it
Help Catch Terrorists?, REASON, Nov. 2003, available at http://www.reason.com/0311
/fe.jb.show.shtml.
227. See Braunstein, supra note 166, at 241 (arguing that "lawyers have become
marginalized in the residential real estate transaction"); see also Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Attorney
Approval Clauses in Residential Real Estate Contracts - Is Half a Loaf Better than None?, 48
KAN. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000) ("Yet, for the majority of residential real estate transactions today,
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transactions has been debated for years, and the majority of states
have chosen not to require attorney participation in residential real
estate transactions. 228 Lawyers are only involved in about 40 percent
of residential real estate transactions, 229 which reveals that their
responsibility for compliance will arise less than half of the time.
Thus, in most instances, it would not be effective to expect the lawyer
to be responsible for compliance with the anti-money laundering
procedures. 230 The other parties listed earlier in priority on the list
will more likely be involved in the transaction.
Also, frequently there is limited or no communication between
parties to a transaction, which makes implementation of the proposal
difficult.231 In order to combat this problem, the primarily responsible
party would need to communicate early in the transaction 232 with each
party to ensure the compliance was completed. 233
Another difficulty that might arise in implementing the
proposed solution is that fields which have not historically been
heavily regulated, like title insurance, real estate brokerage, escrow
agency, and the law, might object to being policed in this way. The
FinCEN should analyze the effect of increased regulation to determine
fewer and fewer lawyers are being employed early in the process to advise and protect the
parties from these perils.").
228. See Tara Austin, Legal Professionalism: Doe v. McMaster and the Lawyer's Role in Real
Estate, 55 S.C. L. REV. 591, 591 (2004) ("Many jurisdictions have pondered the topic, and most
courts have been less hostile to the idea of nonlawyers conducting real estate closings than the
courts of South Carolina."). South Carolina requires the presence of an attorney at real estate
closings through statutes, conduct rules, and common law. Id. New York also requires that an
attorney prepare "deeds, mortgages or any other instruments affecting real estate." REAL ESTATE
BROKERAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.04 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2004). Yet, Arizona implemented
a constitutional amendment that allows real estate brokers to draft instruments used in real
estate transactions. Id. Finally, Washington has taken a more unique approach through "Rule
12," which was established in 1983 and created a new group of lay practitioners, referred to as
closing officers, who are able to "select, prepare and complete certain legal documents incident to
the closing of real estate transactions." Id.
229. Braunstein, supra note 166, at 241.
230. See id. at 241 (evidencing that "lawyers have become marginalized in the residential
real estate transaction"); see also Noble-Allgire, supra note 227, at 339 ('Yet, for the majority of
residential real estate transactions today, fewer and fewer lawyers are being employed early in
the process to advise and protect the parties from these perils.").
231. Closings can either occur face-to-face or through escrow by which the parties do not
have to meet face-to-face. The face-to-face or "table" closings occur more frequently in the eastern
states, while the escrow closings are more popular in California and other western states. See
Joan H. Story, REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 9, 28-29 (Practicing
Law Institute 2000).
232. This time period could be set by the FinCEN after doing some research to determine a
reasonable amount of time in regard to how long is generally spent preparing for real estate
transactions.
233. The details of how this communication would need to occur should be determined by the
FinCEN in establishing a regulation and are outside the scope of this Note.
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which federal agencies would be best qualified to regulate these
under-regulated areas. In doing so, it should take into account the
costs imposed on the regulator and the additional manpower
necessary to shoulder that burden.
Finally, despite the increased. cost of implementing the anti-
money laundering program across the board in real estate, the nature
of the crime necessitates undertaking these measures. It is important
that no one is exempted from the definition because terrorists will
target this group. Such a result would defeat the purpose of
implementing the program.
V. CONCLUSION
The Patriot Act is one of the most comprehensive efforts to
eliminate terrorist financing through anti-money laundering
provisions. 234  The implementation of the Act upon financial
institutions reinforced President George W. Bush's resolute comments
on September 11, 2001: "Terrorist acts can shake the foundations of
our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of
America. These acts shatter steel but they cannot dent the steel of
American resolve. '235  Although real estate transactions have
remained temporarily exempted from implementation since the
enactment of the law, these anti-money laundering requirements will
be imposed upon "persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements." In the war against terror, it is important that no sector
of American business remains vulnerable to terrorist financing.
Although many would argue that the implementation of strict
requirements on the real estate sector would cost more than the
benefits reaped, the short-term costs pale in comparison to the
extraordinary cost - both in lives and in dollars - of future large scale
terrorist attacks. While the ANPRM received varying comments
regarding the application of the proposed rule to real estate, one
common theme remained: the almost unanimous support for the
234. See John W. Snow, Blood Money, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2004, at A14 (explaining that
"one of the most critical things the 9/11 Commission hearings have brought to light is the
important role the Patriot Act plays in helping to win the war on terror. We have heard a lot
about 'the wall' - a conceptual barrier that prohibited agencies such as the FBI and CIA from
communicating freely with each other. That wall was knocked down when President Bush signed
the Patriot Act in October 2001").
235. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Following Alleged Terrorist Attacks
on New York and Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org
/newshour/bb/military/terroristattack/bushspeech.html.
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Administration's efforts to prevent, prohibit, and cut off terrorists'
sources of funding.236
Since the real estate sector, remains vulnerable to abuse by
money launderers, 237 the field must not go unregulated. Although real
estate might not be the most effective way for money launderers to
legitimize their funds, it will likely become a more appealing outlet to
money launderers as recent regulation has completely blocked many
other outlets. In order to successfully fulfill the Patriot Act's goal of
deterring and punishing "terrorist acts in the United States and
around the world,"' 238 no channel should remain available for use by
money launderers.
Implementing the anti-money laundering standards upon the
real estate sector forces the FinCEN to deal with many complicated
and controversial issues. The most effective way to structure the
implementation is to require one primary participant from an ordered
list to bear the responsibility for compliance, while allowing others to
reasonably rely on the designee's efforts to comply with the anti-
money laundering requirements. This entire process would become
more effective and less costly with time, as those involved became
educated on the subject and accustomed to performing the routine
prevention of money laundering procedures during a real estate
transaction. In the end, the mild renovation of the system would be
more than worthwhile in protecting the United States from further
terrorist attacks and the horrifying loss of life.
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Racial Integration and Community
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At the heart of a debate about the future of American race,
housing, and urban policy are two important lawsuits recently filed
in state courts in New Jersey and Connecticut. Plaintiffs challenge
the authority of their respective state housing finance agencies to
fund subsidized units, with U.S. Treasury issued tax credits, in
neighborhoods of racial and social isolation. These cases seek
clarification of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII), parallel
state fair housing provisions, the equal protection clauses of state
and federal constitutions, and the meaning of the two most
important state fair housing cases ever decided. On a broader policy
level, the litigation highlights critical differences between civil
rights advocates and regionalists on one side and many
practitioners of community development and urban political leaders
on the other. Civil rights forces see racial segregation, and the
integrally related concentration of poverty, in the housing market at
the core of the problem of individual opportunity and urban
redevelopment in America. They argue that building and rebuilding
low-income housing in the poorest neighborhoods deepens-or at
least makes permanent-racial and economic barriers between
individuals and metropolitan communities. Community
development forces argue that the building and rebuilding of low-
income housing in poor segregated neighborhoods must continue
and is the only way, within the existing political context, to
revitalize these places. Further, they would argue that civil rights
concerns are not applicable to the allocation of tax credits, and even
more importantly Congress actually gives preference in statute to
using these tax credits in densely poor segregated neighborhoods.
The outcome of these cases, and the broader resolution of these policy
conflicts, could mark an important turning point in U.S. civil rights
law and housing and urban policy.

